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It is suggested that decision-making in public

Massahigher eduoation, speolfloally In the Commonwealth of
terms of
chusetts, might most effectively be understood In

mid-range or "contingencies" theory.

Pour specific con-

tingencies propositions are considered

i

(1) that power Is

contingencies; ( 2 )
the oonsequenoe of control of strategic
is essential for
that consensus from the task environment
the network form resists
the functioning of domain; (3) that
environmental variation;
change until It is necessitated by
attempt to assure network Inand (4) that the polity will
of the network environment
tegrity primarily by manipulation
adequately comprehend the data
Each of these Is found to
public higher education.
presented from Massachusetts
that, to the extent that
Finally, It is suggested

V.

planning -as -computation and plannlng-as- Judgement have become Ineffective for increasingly complex social systems

—as
such as public higher education, planning -as -enabling
consensus
social learning, institutional participation and
represents a necessary and effective alternative.

building—
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CHAPTER

I

UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION
IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

Like

tii

any other institutions these days, higher

education has become the object of widespread skepticism.

After an era of unprecedented growth,

affluence and exalted status in the 1960s, it
stands very much on the defensive.

No longer is it

assured of the unquestioning public regard and
financial support it once enjoyed.

Increasingly,

its benefits
doubts are being raised as to whether

and burdens.
are not outweighed by its costs
Alan Pifer, President

The Carnegie Commission

Introduction
education In America Is
The general status of higher
This
Just five years ago.
demonstrably not what It was even
with the current status of
dissertation Is Intended to deal
of
specifically in the Commonwealth
education,
higher
public

Massachusetts

ment ,

Marshall McLuhan understateTo paraphrase a classic
with a situation Is first
what also helps in dealing
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of all understanding It.

Consequently, this dissertation

Is concerned primarily with the development of an under-

standing.

A theory will be suggested to facilitate such an

understanding, but the adequacy of that theory Is not the
central Issue here.

While some consideration will necess-

arily be given to the question of theoretical adequacy, the
focus of the present study will be on understanding devel-

opments in Massachusetts public higher education.

Theory

will be emphasized as merely a means to that end.
The Problem

Public higher education in the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts Is in trouble.

Following more than a decade

of cqntinuous, rapid expansion, the demand for public higher

education has begun, not merely to level off, but unexpectedly to decline.

For the third consecutive year enrollment

systemwide is down, this year by approximately

8

percent.

This despite the fact that the size of the pool of graduatnot exing high school seniors is still increasing, and is

pected to begin decreasing until early in the next decade.
private
And Just as alarming is the fact that enrollment at
is down
institutions of learning throughout the Commonwealth
public higher
only 1 percent. In other words, Massachusetts
smaller
education is attracting not only a progressively
market, but a relatively
share of a still expanding potential

well.
smaller share of the actual market as

There may be a
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complex of variables operating* but the undeniable fact is
that the market for Massachusetts public higher education

has become seriously "soft".

Nor has this faot been lost on the Governor,

vfho

budget funding
for the third consecutive year has proposed a
level, which is
public higher education only at its current
was funded for fiscal
to say, at the same level for which it
State Legislature has
year 1975. And not to be outdone, the
legislation to refor the past two years been considering
eliminate both the
organize public higher education to

competition for
duplication of services and the increasing
institutions. Thus, the
funding among the various public
of some of these instituautonomy, and the very existence
as a result of this
tions, have begun to be threatened
.

fact of diminishing demand.
consequences, not only
And this fact has critical
but
by public higher education,
employed
directly
those
for
Commonwealth in general. Higher
the eoonomy of the

for

terms
largest Industry, both in
Massachusettsis
education
it introterms of the money which
of employment, and in
public
the state- s economy; and
duces less directly into
the largest sector of
constitutes
education
higher
enterprise
costs inherent in the
fixed
the
Also,
industry.
vary with
for example-do not
service,
debt
and
for pensions
usage does not
extent that current
the
to
And
enrollment.

4

generate Income sufficient to cover these obligations, the

burden of payment shifts to the general fund.

In a state

which only recently has begun to recover some sense of fiscal Integrity, such a shift could be critical.

Given Just

these two considerations, the current decline in demand for

public higher education in Massachusetts should be a source
of tremendous general concern.

The irresistible conclusion is that the system has

not been sufficiently planned; that for a variety of probably political reasons the development of public higher

education in the Commonwealth reflects more the

grasping

of opportunties by professionals and politicians than it

does the careful consideration of longer-term trens.

In

the presence of these suspicions it is probably futile to

note that, in fact, the single factor most responsible for
the current condition of public higher education— the

economy— has been wholly unpredict ible, and has probably
compounded whatever deficiencies in foresight the system

now evidences.

The popular consensus is that Massachusetts

public higher education has been both over-built and underplanned.

Regardless of the extent to which a lack of adequate
condition
planning is actually responsible for the current
the question
of public higher education in the Commonwealth,

might yez imarises as to whether or not adequate planning

.
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prove the capability of public higher education to successfully adjust to current and future variation in demand con-

Evaluation of that possibility begins in a con-

ditions,

sideration of what planning is.
The possibility of planning

John Ruggie (1975) characterizes planning as "pro-

grammatic activity by those in authority, specifically, the
malting of choices other than those which the market would

produce, "

Ruggie identifies two basic planning models: the

comprehensive, and the incremental..

Unfortunately, both

are felt to be essentially deficient.

Comprehensive planning

The defining attribute of the comprehensive planning
model is considered to be the specification of a positive

public "good".

Public higher education would be the posi-

therefore
tive public good in the present study, and would

comprehensive
become the "consummatory objective” of the
plan.

Ruggie (1975s P-130) continues:

positive
Those factors and forces thought to have a wh ll®
Impact upon the public good are supported,
These
those seen to be detrimental are constrained.
instrumental
supports and constraints become the
of
performance
the
objectives of the plan. And
In
adjusted
and
monitored
this entire system is
Indicators
failure
or
keeping with whatever success
report
be desirable exactly
Comprehensive planning Is considered to
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because It purports to be comprehensive; that Is,
to comprehend all relevant variables.

It claims

Its deficiency is

said to inhere in the fact that such comprehension is con-

sidered by critics to be impossible where complex human systems are involved.

According to critics, comprehensive

planning makes cognitive demands which exceed man’s limited

problem-solving capacities and Inherently limited brain
(Winner 1975).

These critics Insist that complex social and

organizational systems must be simplified to be understood,
compreand that, because it fails even to attempt to do so,

hensive planning simply cannot adequately comprehend such
systems.

Further* it is argued that the prescriptions

beyond
generated in comprehensive planning are too often
them.
the existing political capacity to implement

That is,

may in fact be
what is identified in planning as desirable

unattainable as a practical matter.

In short then, the

that it is impossible,
criticism of comprehensive planning is

or Impractical, or both.

Incremental planning
model, Incremental
In contrast to the comprehensive
the
characterized by a realization of
be
to
said
is
planning
sysin comprehending complex
limits of human understanding

tems (Buggie 1975, P-132)«
a ^“ ta1
a
Incrementalism begins not with
one
0
8
as
existing reality
ity, but (rather) takes

»^_°[

'
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alternative and compares the probable gains and
losses of closely related alternatives by making
relatively small adjustments in existing reality,
or by making larger adjustments about whose consequences approximately as much is known as about
the consequences of existing reality, or both.
In addition to making marginal choices and restricting the number of alternatives to be considered, the Incrementalist planner has a definite
strategy for simplification. He factors problems
into nearly independent parts and then deals with
these serially* The success of Incrementalism is
assured, it is believed, because the model simply
apes the manner in which deoislon-makers perceive
problems and make decisions. And should mistakes
be made, their destructive consequences are felt
to be minimized by the marginality of the change
effected.
The deficiencies Inherent in the incremental model
are said to be three-fold: (l) The targets of incremental

planning are the elements of relationships, when It is bethe
coming increasingly evident that what is critical Is

process
nature of the relationships themselves. (2) In the
the elements
of abstracting for the purpose of simplification
of Inappropriately
of a complex system, there is the danger
building
relating the elements In the model; that is, of

of the complex
Into the model a systematic misapprehension
system. And (3), Inrelations which exist In the actual
demand for Itself;
cremental planning creates a spiraling
within a system, increIn changing only specific elements
responses elsewhere within
mentalism triggers compensatory

additional Incremental adjust.
the system, which then require
responded to, and so on s*i
ments which will be similarly

8

Infinitum .

About the possibility of planning, Ruggie
p. 136

)

(

1975 ,

concludes:

We appear to confront a seemingly inescapable series
of paradoxes: in the complex modem societies, the
less foreseeable the future, the more is foresight
required; the less we understand, the more is insight needed; the fewer the conditions which permit
planning, the greater the necessity to plan. Yet
the comprehensive model is too complex for our
simple minds and polities, and the incremental, too
simple for our oomplex societies. Hence, the
H impossibility theorem* and the dilemma of whether
to attempt the seemingly impossible or do nothing at
1

all.

The imperative to understand
What is in fact impossible for an organized system is to
do nothing.

Even in the possibility of the impossibility of

planning, such systems will at least respond to the changing

conditions within which they exist and operate.

And as

James D. Thompson (1967) points out, such response is a
of "befunction not only of desired outcomes or goals, but

as well.
liefs about oause/effeot relations" or understanding
oan he demonstrated
In other words, even where understanding

anticipatory sense, whatto be Inadequate for planning in the
be in part determine
ever understanding which does exist will
Thus, even in the possithe system's response to change.
the necessity remains
bility of the impossibility of planning
understanding possible to assure
to develop the most adequate
organizational response to
the most appropriate possible
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change.
In this sense, then, the question of the posslbllltty

of planning Is Irrelevant; the necessity remains for the

organized system to understand Itself.

And the Intent of

the present study remains the development of just such an

understanding, again, of public higher education In the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Minimally, this understand-

ing must be of the organized complexity which characterizes

that enterprise.

Understanding Complexity

Organized complexity
A system is considered to be "organized" when the
interactions or relations among its elements are intended
or purposeful rather than random (Weaver 1975 )*

The "com-

by LaPorte
plexity" of an organized system has been defined

(1975)

811(1

others as a function (1) of the number of ele-

or
ments in a system, (2) of the relative differentiation

variety of these elements, and (3) of
dependence among these elements.

degree of inter-

Given these understandings,

public higher
there can be no question that Massachusetts

education is both organized and complex.
been understood to
Organized complexity has generally

division of labor (Wilson
be a consequence of the societal
division of labor Is generally
1975). That is, the societal
the relatively large
understood to be responsible for both
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number of social elements or roles in the current society,
and the relatively high degree of both differentiation and

interdependeoe among these elements.

Consequently, organized

complexity has traditionally been viewed as "coercive" rather

than "normative"

That is, the relations within organized

complexity are usually understood to be determined by the

division of labor rather than being chosen by the members
of the society (Etzioni 1968).

The understandings of

organized complexity, therefore, differ primarily on the

question of whether or not this inherent coercion is felt
to be beneficial to the society as a whole.

For Rousseau, for example, organized social complexity destroyed the normative simplicity within which he
felt mankind emerged and prospered; the division of labor

only served to institutionalize individual differences in
sooial roles, thus causing alienation, and a fracturing of

what he termed the "general will".

But Rousseau's is appar-

ently a minority view.
In contrast, the classical economic understanding
the coercive
of organized complexity has been that it is
whloh assures the
i.e., mechanical nature of complexity
aggregates of
responsiveness of the market to significant
simple causal redemand. And for Adam Smith, It was the

—

created by the
lations among the elements of the economy
against tyranny In the
division of labor which protects

•
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marketplace.

Thus the coeroive nature of organized complexity

both the society and
Is viewed as economically beneficial to

the individual.
of
Similarly* the traditional political understanding
to deflect, and
organized complexity has been that It serves
political actions. And
thus to render Indeterminate, direct

felt to be a safeguard
In that sense, such complexity Is
the
oppression. In fact, the creation In

against political

checks and balances reflects
U.S. Constitution of a system of
division of power, while
the Madisonian conviction that a
the legislative process,
coercive In Its determination of
the protection of minority
was nevertheless essential for
from the arbitrary exercise
rights and Individual freedoms

of power by the polity (Wilson 1975)
organized comFinally, the sociolglcal view of
has most often
plexity, according to Wilson (1975, P«292) ,
against disintegration,
been that It Is ". . .a protection
Implies strengthening of
indeed, Its negation, because It
stratification and
primary and secondary associations,

interdependence .
complexity has not been
In general, then, organized
admittedly coercive In Its
understood as a problem. While
relations. It Is nevertheless
determination of societal
politically and sociologically
viewed as economically,
this
and the Individual. In
society
both
for
benlflcent
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sense, organized complexity has more often been understood

as a "solution", than as a "problem".

The current organiza-

tional understanding of organized complexity stands in marked
contrast to this tradition.

Before moving to an extended consideration of the
organizational understanding of organized complexity, however, it should be pointed out that the formal organization
is considered to be essentially different from organized

complexity in general.

Wilson

(

1975* P*289) explains:

It is worth remembering that, in its premeditated
formal quality, the "division of labor" within an
organization is really qualitatively different
from the division of labor in society as a whole.

Differentiation and interdependence, and therefore
difthe qualitative character of complexity, are
are
they
ferent in formal organizations from what
preis
the "informal"
toSoiSy at large whereorganizations
could have
these
dominant, because
division of
no informal structure if the formal
labor were not present.
between organized
Despite this fact of essential difference
organized complexity, this
social complexity and formally
for the divergence of
difference does not In Itself account
of complexity from trathe organizational understanding
sociological views.
ditional economic, political and

commeTitVi

t-ft*

complex organization

Intended here. Is a social
"Organization" , In the sense
goals
the attainment of specific
unit oriented primarily to
deflects
to the extent that It
(Parsons 1951). Consequently,
goals.
action In pursuit of such
organizational
confounds
cr
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complexity constitutes a serious organizational problem.

And it the realization of this fact that increasingly has
come to determine the basic organizational understanding

of organized complexity.

Initially, however, consistent with the traditional

perspectives, the organization recognized complexity as
coercive, but not as a problem.

And, as with the tra-

ditional economic and political views, the mechanistic

metaphor dominated this early understanding.

"Equilibrium"

was the concept suggested to represent the optimal organizational condition, and was defined as the consequence of
simple causal relations among organizational elements.

Frederick Taylor, for example, suggested that industrial
equilibrium would occur at the most efficient ratio between
workers' wages and output.

From this perspective, if equi-

librium were disturbed, balance would be recoverable by
means of adjustments to prior causal elements.

Consequently,

the crucial task for both theorists and managers became the

specification and operationalization of such internal causal
variables.

And what emerged from this concern was a steady

flow of research on such primary intra-organizational
spatio-temporalvariables as size, work-flow, work demands,
structural
physical factors, and heuristics; such mediating
authority
variables as leadership, authority relations,
and such aspects
levels, delegation and departmentalization;
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of control as reward, sanction, measuring Instruments and

standards (Melcher 1975)*

The continued dominance of this mechanistic metaphor
in organizational thought is demonstrated by the fact that,

even in to the late 1960s, when worker absenteeism distorted

input-output ratios in the highly automated American car
Industry,

.

-it

was still widely felt that balance

(equilibrium) should be recoverable through adjustments in

monetary inducements alone” (Starling !975* p.156)

•

This

dominance finally diminished, but only as it has become
obvious that the condition of organizations is a function,
to formal
not only of causally related variables internal
"environmental"
organizational boundaries, but of external or

factors as well.
was still
Even as recently as 10 years ago, it

generated from the
possible to accept the hypothesis—
source of organizamechanistic perspective -that when the
to the formal
tional problems was a function external
organization would
boundaries of the organization, the
critical function. Thus, as
merely expand to absorb the
be reported that
recently as 1967, It could reasonably
expected to be negotiated
sources of supply were generally
(Galbraith 1967).
by means of vertical Integration
however, have made It
Events of the past decade,
which
are certain functions
increasingly clear that there
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are both external to the organization and yet critical to
Its functioning, and which simply cannot be absorbed, or

sometimes even reliably contracted.

Control of energy

resources is an obvious example; consumer demand Is another.

The Inescapable fact Is that there are certain environmental

variables over which the organization Is unlikely ever to
exercise adequate control.

With the realization that this

fact simply cannot be comprehended within the traditional

mechanistic perspective, has come also the suggestion that
a "systems" understanding of organized complexity might

therefore be more effective.
Systems understanding

According to von Bertalanffy (1968), a "system"
consists of "sets of elements standing in interaction."

Huse and Bowditch (1973* P-28) expand on this, defining
a system as
a series of interrelated or interdependent
parts, such that the interaction or interplay of
any of the subsystems affects the whole. In fact,
subthe interactions and interdependencies among
important
as
least
at
be
to
systems are recognized
as the individual elements or variables.

...

then, is that
The advantage of the "systems" understanding,
relations among elements
it recognizes the importance of the
practiConsequently, there is a shift in both
in a system.
understanding only the elecal and analytic concern from

the relations among
ments of a system, to understanding
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elements.
The systems perspective assumes the existence of

general principles applying to, and describing all systems
irrespective of whether they are of a physical, biological
or sociological nature (Buckley 1967). (As will be noted

further on, the validity of this assumption is open to
question.)

The language used to express these "general

principles" is that of the communications sciences. French
and Hall (1973* P«159)> for example, describe the organiza-

tion in systems terms as follows:
An organization starts with "input flows" from
sources in the external environment which then
are "transformed" by technical and/or human subsystems into "outputs" which are then provided
to users.
In addition, most systems Include one
or more "feedback" mechanisms which process the
"signals" from the external or the internal environment indicating whether there is something
wrong with the "output" which might require
changes in the internal system, or in the "outputs", or both'.
In the systems understanding of organized complexity, then,

the external environment is realized to be affecting the

organization, specifically in the form of Information which

requires appropriate organizational response.

Homeostatic systems
The range of possible systems understandings is

bounded on the one end by the mechanistic balance model,
model.
and on the other, by the genetlcally-determlned-growth
an actual systems
In a sense, then, although It Is not In fact

•
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analog, the mechanistic understanding of organized com-

plexity might reasonably be viewed as a "closed system"
perspective*

And in the same sense, it might reasonably be

suggested that the shift in organizational and analytic concern to an environmental focus necessitates merely a shift

from a "closed system" to an "open system" understanding
of organized complexity*

The particular "open system" understanding which has
from what
come to replace the mechanistic model was derived

has been termed a "homeostatic" perspective.
p. 159

)

Starling (1975*

explains:

from
Homeostatic systems concepts were abstracted homeoterm
biological equilibrium processes. The processes
stasis" implies structure -maintaining
aut0 “
These
that are basically dynamic.
matically control deviation by monitors
send back
receive "error messages" and in turn
processes
corrective inf ormat ion • Such feedback
linear, cause
imply a unidirectional, usually
components:
effect relationship between
are altered to
sequences
in oreceedlng processing
in an effect
dampen°devlanoe whenever It Is detected
or output.
understandine of organization
Thus the homeostatic system
'

assumed
mechanistic: causation is still
essentially
still
is
homeoThe superiority of the
prior.
and
simple
both
be
to
recogniinheres entirely in its
static perspective, then,
processes,
organizations of feedback
tion of the existence in
environmental
of organizations to
and of the responsiveness

variation
systems understanding
Criticism of the homeostatic

.
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focuses on the fact that It Is a cybernetic

feedback

—model.

— i.e.,

Again according to Starling

(

negative
p.163),

3.975*

"because organizational processes are assumed to alter only
to dampen deviance, oybemetlc or negative feedback systems

contain no provision for deviation amplification for pur-

poses of adjustment."

In other words, the homeostatic sys-

tem understanding of organization is essentially behavioral:
all organizational response is assumed to be merely responsive.

This means that Internally initiated organizat-

ional change such

as goal modification, for example, simply

cannot be accomodated within the homeostatic model; nor can

the Increasingly common organizational activity of attempting to anticipate

— even

to manipulate

—market

conditions.

Given this deficiency, what has been suggested by theorists
systems
is a further shift, this time to an "adaptive"

understanding

Adaptive systems
critical
Starling (1975* P*3.66) suggests that the
the recognition
attribute of the "adaptive" system model is
in the
"morphogenic" or experience-storing processes
of

organization.

Thus,

responses
Short-term or transitory organizational
recogpre-deslgned
or
Ire derived ?rom pre-existing
utilizing pre-en
nition and response capabilities
parameters
information regarding system
the o h
More permanent adaptation, on
ro
own prior experience.
quires that the system use its
*

.
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In the adaptive view, organizational structures and be-

havior are not understood in terms of mere response; they
are seen instead as emerging in the interaction between

the organization's morphogenic processes and the pressures

exerted by the organization's environment.

The other significant aspect of the adaptive model
is its realization that the set of structural and processual

relations whioh define the organization is dynamic.

Con-

sequently, again according to Starling (1975» P«l69)>

Though an adaptive system may be loosely comprehended,
deterits precise state at any given moment cannot be
shifts
mined. Therefore, the task of the organization
profrom one of simplifying structure and production
to
process
cesses, to one of simplifying the learning
sigdiscriminate among the myriad, ofetn redundant,
nals being received.
Immediate concern Is not
For the adaptive system, then, the
the Immediate concern Is
to improve functional efficiency;
which "signals"
merely to understand what Information—
critical for operation.
from the environment—might he
the dynamic nature
Finally, In its recognition of
the organization, the adaptive
of the relations which define
possibility of the impossisystems analog recognizes the
of constructing conditions.
bility of planning In the sense
notes,
As Wilson (1975> P-325)

The organization is

/"f Xpt^tS
Is

strive

regarded
than It
host lie” environment^ more
organizing an Inchoate,
as regenerated
neutral environment.

-
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For all of these reasons, then. It is the understanding provided by the adaptive systems analog which
seems most adequately to comprehend the actual experience
of the complex organization.

However, there is consider-

able concern among both theorists and managers over the

difficulty In applying systems models in general.

The

difficulty is felt to originate in the very generality of
systems concepts which was felt to be the strength of that

mode of understanding.

Criticism of the systems accroach
The key concepts in ageneral systems understanding
are suggested to include subsystems, wholism, system boundcy
aries, negentropy, steady state, dynamic equilibrium,

bemetic process, internal elaboration, multiple goal(Kast and Rosen
seeking and equifinality, as a partial list

zwelg 1972).

Critics of the systems approach argue that,

these concepts
when applied to the organized social field,
and that both the cause
are ambiguous rather than general,
been the isolation of
and the effect of that ambiguity has
(19^9* P«29) explains
theory from actual experience. Blumer

clearly their
These terms do not discriminate
allow on y
empirical instances. At best they is so roughly
what
in
rough identification, and
a
Ad
thev do not permit a determination
concept and what Is not.
of w^t is'oovered by the
practical consequences of this
Blumer then points out the
•i

fact i

-f*i

:
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This ambiguous nature of concepts . . . hinders
us in coming to close grips with our empirical
world* for we are not sure what to grip. Our
uncertainty as to what we are referring obstructs
us from asking pertinent questions. The vague
sense dulls our perceptions and thus vitiates
directed empirical thought. It subjects our reflections on possible relations between concepts
to wide bands of error. It encourages our
theorizing to revolve in a separate world of its
own with only tenuous connection with the empirical world. And it limits severely the clarification and growth that concepts may derive from
findings of research.
Thus, to the extent that its concepts do in fact obstruct

the asking of pertinent questions, the general systems

approach precludes the very kind of understanding which
according to the
is essential for organizational survival

adaptive analog.
systems
Also, there is a sense in which general
to George Homans
theory is not a theory at all. According
in the
sets of concepts such as those specified
(

1970, p. 60),

not a theory, but a
general systems approach constitute,
"con 0 eptual

s cheme "

e,

not that general systems
The important point here Is
of organized
presently constitute a theory
concepts do not p:
critics.
crucial, according to the
social complexity . What is
,
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is the realization that, because of the ambiguous nature of

these concepts, at least in their application to the social
field, these concepts cannot presently be related by the

contingencies propositions which define a theory.

Because

of their ambiguity, it is argued that general systems con-

cepts simply do not make contact with their empirical in-

stances sufficient to permit generation of the kinds of

propositions essential for a theory.

Consequently, the

general systems models resist being brought into a close
so
and self -correcting relation with the empirical world
tested, refined
that their proposals about that world can be

(Blumer 1969).
and enriched by the data of that world

At

theory even in
least In its current form, general systems
seems not to be sufficiently
its promising adaptive analog—
understanding necessary to
grounded to generate the kind of
response to experience.
assure appropriate organizational

approach is merely
Actually, the general systems
be termed "general theoretical
the most recent of what might
systems general theories
perspectives". In this sense, the
mechanistic general theories.
might be said to succeed the
Parsons
theories" has been said by
"general
of
advantage
The
Integration
that it ensures "the kind of
(1959, P.89) to be
emonly the availability and
and directed activity which
sysand general theoretical
ployment of a well-articulated
that
Homans (1970) suggests
science."
a
to
give
can
tem

23

the attraction of theorists to "general theory" Is a con-

sequence of their confusion of ends with means.

According to Homans, social theorists especially
tend to confuse the way a theory looks when it is fully

developed with the way a theory is arrived at:

—

Since a completed theory and it is never more
than provisionally completed—works downward,
so to speak, from general propositions to less
general empirical ones, they feel that the
process of theory -building should work downward too, starting from very general considerations and hoping eventually to reach the data
(1970, p.60).

While Homans does not rule out the possibility that sound
social or organizational theory might yet be developed by

means of the downward -moving strategy, he does suggest what
he feels would be a more appropriate approach, given the

current stage of development of the social sciences:

This strategy starts with the empirical findings
themselves, and seeks to invent the more general
propositions from which these same findings, and,
be
under different conditions, other findings may
derived.
has been termed
Theory developed by means of this strategy
theory".
"theory of the middle range" or "contingencies

The "middle ran ge" approach
summarize the
Kast and Rosenzweig (1972, p.463)

contingencies theory:
support for middle-range or
view is someThe general tenor of the contingency

2k

modem organizations

but uses patterns of relationships and/or configurations of subsystems
in order to facilitate improved practice.
Management is seen as increasingly relying on a
reasonable success rate for actions in a probabilistic environment.

Anant Negandhi (1975* P-118) concurs:
Until general systems concepts are further developed and operationalized, the mid-range
approach contingencies theory— provides perhaps
the most realistic means of still utilizing some
of the salient features of the systems approach
in understanding complex organization.

—

Accepting the validity of the criticism of the general
Chapter
systems concepts, this study will concern itself in
2

theory.
with an extended consideration of contingencies

He capitulation
purpose of
As was stated in the Introduction, the

understanding of Public
this dissertation is to develop an
Commonwealth of Massahigher education, specifically in the
such an understanding is
chusetts. It was suggested that
the anticipatory sense,
critical, if not for planning in
most appropriate response possi
then at least to assure the
to changes in the conditions
ble by public higher education
operates.
within whloh it exists and
that, minimally, this under
It was also suggested
complexity which charactstanding must be of the organised

erizes that enterprise.

traditional
A brief review of the

revealed
sociological perspectives
economic, political and
been recogcomplexity has generally
organized
while
that,
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nized as coercive, it has nevertheless been vievied more
as a solution than a problem.

That is, the complex of

relations created by the societal division of labor has
generally been understood to be beneficial to both the
individual and society*

However, it was suggested that

for goal -oriented enterprises such as public higher education, because it deflects and confounds actions in pursuit

of such goals, organized complexity represents a serious

problem, and therefore the traditional understandings do not

obtain.

The course of development of the organizational

understanding of organized complexity was then reviewed,
current systems
from the early mechanistic metaphor to the
because
analogs. These last were found to be unacceptable

them Impractical.
the ambiguity of their concepts renders
been suggested as
It was then found that what has
is the middle-range
an alternative to the systems models
attempts to generate the
or contingencies approach which
data of experience. To
more general propositions from the
of organized complexity
understand that particular instance
we therefore
Massachusetts public higher education,

which is

contingencies theory.
turn to a consideration of

CHARTER II
CONTINGENCIES THEORY

Although presented some 10 years ago, James D.
Thompson's Organ 1 zat ion s In Action

(

1967

)

Is still generally

considered to be the best available synthesis of middlerange theory on complex organization (Rushing and Zald 1976).

Thompson Intended merely to develop a "conceptual Inventory"
of the field, but what emerges Instead Is a well-developed

system of contingency propositions—a theory.

In briefest

summary, Thompson's view of the complex organization is

based on the following assumptions:
The organization contains more variables than we
can comprehend at one time, some subject to Influences we cannot control or predict
(Also), parts and their relationships are determined through evolutionary processes
Thus we conceive of complex organizations as open
systems, hence indeterminate and faced with uncertainty, but at the same time, as subject to
criteria of rationality and henoe needing determinateness and certainty (1967 jP*10).

....
....

complex organizations
For Thompson, the essential fact about
critical tension between
is the existence within them of the
continuing need for
the reality of uncertainty, and the
"actions" are a
rationality. For Thompson, organizational

function of this tension.
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Rationality and uncertainty

As was noted earlier, Thompson suggests that organizational actions are rooted both in "desired outcomes" or
goals, and In "beliefs about oause/effect relations" or

understanding.

The extent to which this understanding

assures the organization of the attainment of its goals is
what is meant by "rationality" (Thompson 1967)*

Thus,

rationality is a function, not only of the understanding of
the cause/effect relations relevant to goal attainment, but

also of the control of the organization over such relations.

Understanding alone is viewed as insufficient to assure
goal attainment.

"Perfect rationality" requires both a

complete understanding of, and complete control over,

critical cause/effect relations.

Thompson (1967) defines three levels of rationality:
technical, organizational and institutional.

Only the first

two levels, technical and organizational, are of concern

here.

According to Thompson (1967)* "technical rationality
controlling cause/effect
Is concerned with understanding and
the
relations internal to the organization, including
lntra-organizatlonal
organizational technology Itself, and the

variables noted in Chapter One.

As a result of the fact that

variables were the single
for more than fifty years such
concern, these factors
foous of both theoretical and practical
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are generally felt to be both adequately understood and

sufficiently controlled to assure a relatively high level

technical rationality.
"Organizational rationality", on the other hand, is

concerned not only with technical rationality, but with
cause/effect relations external to the organization’s
boundaries, in what is therefore the organizational environment.

Thompson (196?) suggests that as complexity in the

environment increases, organizational understanding of the
environment becomes less certain, and organizational ra-

tionality to that extent becomes "bounded".

Uncertainty and "bounded rationality"
the
It might be remembered that in an open system

environment is experienced as information.

In this sense,

quality
uncertainty might therefore be considered to be a
and/or complexity
of understanding when the nature, flow
exceed the capacity of
of information from the environment
Thus, increasing
it.
the organization to accurately process
that it exceeds the
environmental complexity, to the extent
it, generates incapacity of the organization to process
understanding which, to
creased uncertainty or diminished
organizational rationality,
that extent, "bounds" or limits
goal attainment.
and with it, the assurance of
rationality are very real.
The effects of bounded
Is
business In a complex economy
notes,
)
1967
Galbraith
C
As
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"•

•

•

mostly contract negotiation."

Contracting, however,

requires exactly the kinds of assurance of performance performance or goal attainment which only a relatively high

degree of organizational rationality can provide.

Conse-

quently, to the extent that environmental complexity bounds
or limits organizational rationality, assurances about per-

formance must be qualified, making contract negotiation
that much more difficult, and thus threatening the very

existence of the organization.
If the environment is the source of the uncertainty

which so seriously threatens the organization, the obvious
solution would seem to be to close the organization to the

environment.

In the mid-range understanding of complex

organization, this is clearly not possible.
The Complex Organization

Domain and consensus

According to Thompson (1967b organizations necessarily occupy social space within their environment.

This

"space" constitutes the "domain" of the organization, which,

according to Levine and White (1961), is determined by the
product or
claims made by the organization concerning what

population or
service it seeks to provide, and for what

market.

about what funcIn a sense, then, in making claims

organization selects
tion it will perform, and for whom, the

with the environment;
the points at which it will make contact
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but only In a limited sense.

As Thompson

(

1967 , p.28)

points out, domain Is consensual.

The establishment of domain cannot be an arbitrary
unilateral action. Only if the organization's
claims to domain are recognized by those who can
provide the netcessary support can a domain be
operational. Only if the organization is judged
by those in contact with it as offering something
desirable will it receive the inputs necessary for
survival.

From this perspective, therefore, it is impossible

for, the

organization to be other than open to the environment: the
organization does not merely exist within an environment,
it depends upon the environment within it exists for valida-

tion of its domain

—for

"domain consensus"

—which

is essen-

tial, not only for acquiring necessary inputs, but for

output disposal as well.

The form of validation or consensus

is described in terms of "exchange".

Exchange and the task environment
In the mid-range understanding, the concept of

range of
"exchange" is used to represent any of the full
and the
relations and interactions between the organization
1961). Anaelements of its environment- (Levine and White

which are siglytic focus, however, is on those exchanges
organizational goals.
nificant for the realization of
theory is that
The assumption underlying exchange
has something which the
each party to a potential exchange
What is exchanged, thereother party needs (Clegg 1975).
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fore* are "resources".

In the mid-range understanding,

the concept of resources refers not only to materials, but
to personnel, clients. Information, Influence and capital,
as veil*

The concept of exchange merely recognizes that

both the organization and the various elements of its
environment control resources which the other needs, and
that the satisfaction of the needs of both can most effect-

ively be achieved by an exchange process.

Exchange is the

form of domain consensus or validation in the sense that,
to the extent that the environment engages in exchange with

a given organization, the claims by that organization concerning the social space which it seeks to occupy are con-

sensually validated.

The term "environment", however, is residual; it
refers potentially to everything which is not the organization.

Thompson (1967) suggests the concept of "task en-

vironment" to more accurately represent the focus of

organizational concern.

The concept of "task environment" is defined by
of the environDill (1958) as referring to those elements
relevant, for
ment which are ". • . relevant, or potentially
sense, task engoal-setting and/or achievement." In this
which Evan (1966)
vironment Is similar to "organization set"
of the environdescribes as referring only to those parts
resource allocation or
ment which significantly affect
task environment redistribution . Prom this perspective,

•
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fers to, among other things, suppliers of resources,

customers and/or clients, competitors, and regulatory

groups such as government agencies, unions and Inter organizational groups and associations.
In the mid-range or contingencies understanding,

then, the organization is not indiscriminately dependent

upon everything which is outside its formal boundaries.
The organization is seen as dependent only upon its task
environment , l.e., upon those elements in the environment

which can significantly affect either goal -setting and/or
achievement, or resource allocation and distribution.
Thus, it is only within its task environment that the

organization must achieve domain consensus or validation i
that
it is only with the elements of its task environment

the organization must engage in exchange.
these
However, because organizational control over

dependency of the
critical exchanges is never complete, the
environmental elements
organization upon even these specific
to the organiintroduces both constraints and contingencies
zation.

Thompson

(

19 ^ 7 * P«24) explains:

to environmental
When the organization is opened involved in.
influences, some of the factors
for
organizational actions become "constraints
some meaningful period of time to which the
variables, but fixed conditions
the fac ors^
organization must adapt. Some of
not v y,
"contingencies'* which may or may
by the
control
arbitrary
are not subject to
organization
,
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It is in the constraints and contingencies to which it opens

the organization, that the dependency of the organization on
its task environment introduces the uncertainty which bounds

rationality.

Consequently, according to the mid-range

understanding, to minimize contingencies and therefore

maximize rationality the organization is expected to be
primarily concerned with the management of its dependency.
The management of dependency

The mid-range or contingencies understanding of

dependency is described by Emerson (1962, p*33)s

An organization is dependent upon some element of
its task environment (l) in proportion to the need
of the organization for resources or performances
which the element provides, and (2) in inverse
proportion to the ability of other elements to
provide the same resource or performance.
Power is considered to be the obverse of dependence, i.e.,
a function both of control over resources needed in the

environment, and the degree of control over such resources.
Thus, both dependency and power are felt to vary not only

with the locus of control over needed resources, but also
with the concentration or dispersion of that control.

For

Thompson (1967, p.32), this is a most effective understanding of these two concepts:

proThe power -dependency concept advanced here
"zero-sum”
vides an important escape from the
system
concept of power which assumes that, in a
a
power
composed of A and B, the power of A is
the
the expense of B. By considering power in
possicontext of interdependence, we admit the

.
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bllity of A and B becoming increasingly powerful
with regard to each other—the possibility that
increasing interdependence may result in a net
increase in power for both. It is upon this
possibility that coalitions rest.

From this perspective, then, even a position of relatively
high power in relation to a given environmental element does
not necessarily reduce organizational dependence on that
element.

Thus the primary task of the organization is still

expected to be the management of its dependence.

Management strategies
The strategies available to the organization for the

management of its dependency are described by Thompson

(

1967

)

is
To the maximum extent possible, the organization

off" or
expected to avoid dependency by attempting to "seal

environmental
at least "buffer" its core technology from

variation.

Where resource acquisition and/or product dis-

contingencies
posal or distribution represent unacceptable
processing, for example, it is
in terms of input and output
attempt to expand its
expected that the organization will
In fact, this is
boundaries to absorb these functions.
integration.
exactly what happens in vertical
the organization
Alternatively, it is suggested that

dependency relations by changing
might also manage or modify
the organization
Because a change In goals by
It goals.
being claimed, such a
constitutes a change In the domain
task
In the organization's
change
a
Involves
also
change
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environment, and consequently, a change in dependency re-

lations as well.
Finally, competition is also suggested as a possible

strategy for the management of dependency.

But competition

is more accurately a means to increasing power by increasing

control within a given market, and as was noted above, in-

creased power does not necessarily assure decreased dependence.
In fact, each of these strategies

—boundary

expansion,

goal changing and competition— is seen as too costly for the

organization to pursue, or as precluded by the nature of the
core technology to which the organization is committed.

Consequently, it is expected that complex organizations

will most often attempt to manage dependency by formalizing
contingencies utilizing essentially cooperative strategies.

Cooperative strategies

Thompson (196?, p.3*0 explains the basis for the
cooperative relation:

Using cooperation to gain power with respect to
some element of the task environment, the organization must demonstrate its capacity to reduce
uncertainty for that element, and must make a
commitment to exchange that capacity.
managing dependency
Paradoxically, the most effective means of
of that dependency reis considered to be the formalization

formalized in
Thus cooperation is expected to be
"contracting", or
one or a combination of three forms: (1)
for the exchange of perthe negotiation of an agreement

lation.
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formances in the future; (2) "co-opting" , or the process of

absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-making
structure as a means of averting threats to organizational
stability; and (3) "coalescing", which Involves a combina-

tion or joint venture with another organization in the
task environment (Thompson 1967)*
That cooperation is, in fact the preferred strategy
in the management of organizational dependency is supported

by Galbraith's remark (196?) noted earlier, that "Business,
it can now be said with only slight exageration, is mostly

contract negotiation."

And Thompson (1974) himself

documents the recent increase of literature describing the

general trend toward "sets of organizations which together
account for results."

For Thompson, this trend requires

"interorganizaexpansion of the mid-range focus to include

tional" or "network" phenomena.

The Intel-organizational Network

Thompson

(

interorgani1974» P*3) suggests that the

.the desire
.
of
zational form emerges as a consequence
for results requiring more
on the part of the organization
simpler organizational
coordination than is possible In
emergence of the interorganlforms." In this respect, the
hypothesis (1967) that
zational network confirms Thompson’s
dependence Is expected to reincreased lnterorganizatlonal
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suit In a net Increase In power among the cooperating

organizations.

Unfortunately, James Thompson died before

he could develop further a mid-range understanding of

the interorganizational network.

However, such an under-

standing has been developed in what is termed "strategic

contingencies" theory.

A "strategic contingencies" understanding
According to Clegg (1975.

P-W,

the term "strategic

contingencies" refers to the fact that, in a network of
organizations,

"...

sub-units can be seen to be exchanging

control of strategic contingencies," in order to acquire

power through the exchange.
The interorganizational network
InterorganiHickson (1971. P-219) suggests that the
organization,
zational network, like the Individual

"...

uncertainties in the
deals with environmentally derived
the processing of
sources and composition of inputs, in
of outputs. The
through-puts, and again, in the disposal
seen to be the work of
reduction of these uncertainties is
"reduction work" is underthe network sub-units, and this
the network (Clegg 1975)stood as what is exchanged within
an open system of cooperating
Thus the network is viewed as
within the network is
organizations whose primary function

confronts
the uncertainty which
of
aspect
some
with
"coping"
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the network in the pursuit of its goals.

From this perspective* each cooperating organization
is recognized as having power to the extent that it controls

some contingency which bounds network rationality.

Unlike

the individual organization, power in the network is dispersed

throughout the netwok.

Consequently, in the contingencies

understanding, it is expected that, to survive, the inter-

organizational network will be concerned primarily with
limiting the power of each of the cooperating organizations,
and with encouraging the use of differential power to function within the network rather than to destroy it (Hickson
1971* p.219)*

For the interorganizational network, then,

the primary task is understood to be the maintenance of the

stability of the network power infrastructure.

Consequently,

the focus of network concerns is expeoted to be on the co-

efficients of power of the cooperating network organizations.
Power and the network organization
In the strategic contingencies view, the power of

function
the individual network organization is defined as a
of its relations
(l) of interorganizational relations, or

and (2)
with the other cooperating network organizations;

p»217)*
of network -environment relations (Hickson 1971*

organization is a
That is, the power of any given network
exercises within
function not only of the control which it

which that control
the network, but also of the degree to
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is essential to the network in its relations with the en-

vironment.

Because maintenance of the stability of the network
power infrastructure is considered to be the primary concern
of the network, any variation in that infrastructure Is

assumed to be the consequence of changes in the environment.
That is, changes in the network* s power infrastructure is

described in tenns of network adaptation to changed or
changing environmental conditions.

And any change in the

experience of power by a given network organization is ex-

pected to be the consequence of that organization facilitating network adaptation to environmental change.

It is in

this sense that the power of any given network organization
is considered to be a function both of interorganizational

relations, and of the network's relations with its task
environment.

Changing the network power Infrast ructure

Despite the fact that change in the network infrastructure is expected to be the consequence of change in the
is
environment, the strategic contingencies understanding

viewed as
not exclusively behaviorist; the network is not

being merely responsive to the environment.

In fact, to

strictly behavioral
describe the interorganizational network in
alternative actions
terms would be to misapprehend the range of
Organization of Petroleum
available to the network form. The
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Exporting Countries (OPEC), for example has dramatically

proven that the interorganlzatlonal network is capable of
purposeslve action which simply cannot be comprehended
from a strictly behavlorist position.

In recognition of

this fact, the contingencies model views the network as

capable of the same range of purposive action as the Indi-

vidual organization; of changing goals, for example, and
In the sense explained earlier, of therefore selecting the

environment to which it will respond.
However, because a change In network goals necess-

arily implies realignment of the network power infrastructure;

and because the stability of that infrastructure is consideered
to be the primary concern of the network, internally initiated

network change is viewed as unlikely unless it originates

with the coalition dominating network decision-making. Consequently, while the possibility of internally initiated

network change is recognized in the contingencies perspecexpected to be on the
tive, the focus of network concern is
variation which
environment as the probable source of the
can threaten infrastructural stability.

network
The possibility of environment -effected
network organichange is also of conoem to the individual
network change is unzations. Since internally-initiated
it is expected that
likely for the reasons considered above,

modify the existing power
network organizations seeking to
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infrastructure will attempt to do so by indirect means, or

more specif ically, by manipulation of the network environment.
This strategy is described by Thompson (1974, p.14) as
"manipulated field control", which is deliberate action on
the field of the environment of the network in order to

necessitate a definite response by the network, by manipulating conditions in the environment.

Because the power of

any given network organization is in part a function of the

criticality of the contingency which it controls for the
network, it is expected that the network organization will

attempt to improve its power position within the network

by manipulating conditions in the network environment to
increase the criticality of the control which it exercises.
The fact that some degree of environmental manipu-

lation is open to most organizations has been documented by
James Child (1969).

And Bensen (1975) suggests the follow-

ing dimensions of environmental variation as potential tar-

gets for manipulations (1) resource concentration/dispersion,
in one
or the extent to which control over resources resides

power concenor many participants in the environment; (2)
participants
tration/dispersion, or the extent to which some
in the environment dominate others;

(3)

network autonomy/

network is dependent
dependence, or the extent to which the
dominance, or
upon its task environment; (4) environmental
(e.g., bureaucracy
the locus of power in the environment,
abundance/ scarcity, or the
vs. the public); (5) resource
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amount of resources In the environment which are available
for exchange; and (6) the mechanism of control in the en-

vironment! (i.e., ranging from active to passive).

Obvi-

ously! some dimensions of variation are more open to organi-

zational manipulation than others.

Still, in general, the

environment is viewed as open to the organizations with

which it is engaged in exchange.
control,

Even the mechanism of

for example, which is essentially determined by

the relevant polity, is seen as to some degree negotiable.

Thompson (1974) however, suggests that as the network form
proliferates, the role of the polity in determining the

mechanism of control in the various network environments is
increasingly significant.
The network and the polity

Thompson (1974) points out theat, because power in
form of
the network is diffuse, decision-making takes the

bargaining or negotiation.
and bargaining involve

And it is because negotiation

future performances by at least one

networks
party to the transaction that interorganizational
infrastructures
require the relatively stable or enduring
it is the funcdiscussed above. For Thompson (1974, p.20),
stability:
tion of the polity to assure the necessary
regard to InterA major role of the polity (in provide and stabilize
networks), is to
organizational
£
the ^ar^s
an infrastructure which permits
In eac
if not ^each
confidence—
have
zations involved to
organization
One
o?her“then at least In the system.
*
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is not likely to provide present performances
for another’s obligation unless it has confidence,
not only in the ability of the other to perform
properly in the future, but also in its willingness or the system’s intention to enforce the
contract. Still more important, however, is the
confidence in the equitability (of what is exchanged) at two points in time confidence that
the relative values of the performances will
remain comparable.

—

For Thompson, then, the existence of interorganizational

networks depends to a considerable degree on a polity capable
of maintaining both a stable economy, and a legal structure

sufficient to compel conformity to contracts.
In the contingencies understanding,

it is expected

that the polity will function to assure network stability,

not by direct Intervention in network decisions, but by less
direct means, including for example, manipulated field control.

In support of this hypothesis, Thompson offers the

to con
the situation of the Federal Reserve Board attempting

available
trol inflation, not by limiting the supply of
money is availmoney, but by regulating the terms on which
according to
able. Such indirect methods are preferable,

Thompson (197^> p.20), because
government"
Unlike bargaining, which pits "big hierarchical
against smaller organizations, or
those
command which Is often resented bycompounded
error
to it, and also runs the risk of indirect managewhen conditions become complex, decision-making In
ment of Infrastructures leaves potentially in
the hands of the organizations
thus free to assess
volve^ Each organization is
own configuration.
the affects of changes for Its
organization, then, are
Both the polity and the network

ex-

•
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peoted in the contingencies view to seek to modify network

behavior primarily by manipulation of the network environenvlronment .

For the lnterorganlzational network

,

as for

the individual organization, therefore, what is critical is

the control of strategic contingencies existing in the task

environment
Recapitulation
What the contingencies understanding of organization

suggests might be summarized in this way: (1) Organizational

action

— i.e.,

decisions

—are

seen as rooted both in desired

outcomes or goals, and in rationality or understanding and
control of cause/effect relations critical to the organization.
(2) Because the organization is dependent upon its task en-

vironment for essential resources, however, the rationality
of the organization is described as bounded or limited, and

with it, the assurance of goal attainment which is crucial
in the current negotiated economy.

(3) Consequently,

the

organization is expected to be primarily concerned with the
rationality,
management of dependency to limit its effects on
and contingencies
and with the management of the constraints
(4) While a number of
Introduced by the fact of dependency.
are felt to be
strategies for the management of dependency

that the most
possible for the organization, it is expected
interorganizaprobable strategies will be those involving

formalization of dependencies.
tlonal cooperation or negotiated

The network form is felt to be a manifestation of this
probability,
(5) The interorgan izational network is described as

a consequence of a common desire for more formal, and there-

fore more effective, coordination than is possible with

simpler organizational forms, (6) Like the individual organization, the interorganizational network is assumed to be

bounded or limited in terms of rationality, and therefore
is expected to be similarly concerned with the management of

dependency and the contingencies which it includes.

(7)

Be-

cause power in the network is diffuse, however, unlike the

individual organization, the interorganizational network
must be concerned with significant contingencies internal
to its boundaries, i.e., with maintaining the stability of

the network power infrastructure, (8) Consequently, the

network is expected to be primarily concerned with managing
the use of differential power to function within the network
to maintain assurance of goal attainment.

In short, the

central organizational concern of the network is expected
relations
to be maintenance of the stability of intra-network

stability is,
(9) Since infrastructural

in this sense

expected that
the immediate purpose of the network, it is
response to ennetwork change will most often be only in

vironmental variation.

(10) Intentional network change,

primarily by meariS
therefore, is expected to be effected
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manipulated field control, or the manipulation of the net-

work environment.

(11) It is expected that the polity espe-

cially will utilize manipulation of the environment in its

increasingly important function of assuring network infrastructures.

Theory to Data
The critical question for the present study is this:
adequate
Is the contingencies understanding of organization
to comprehend public higher education in the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts?

Response to this question requires appli-

Massachusetts
cation of the contingencies propositions to

public higher education.

The adequacy of specifically four

be considered
fundamental contingencies propositions will
is essential for
(l) that domain consensus
in Chapter 3:
a consequence of
organizational survival; (2) that power is
that change in netcontrol of strategic contingencies; (3)

until necessitated by signiwork behavior will be resisted
and (4) that the polity
ficant environmental variation;
means to effect modificawill utilize essentially indirect
task now becomes one of
tion of network behavior. The
with data from the field.
confronting these propositions

CHAPTER III

MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION:

DATA TO THEORY
Decisions of resource adequacy
In a publio servioe enterprise such as public

higher education it is expected that decisions will most
often involve considerations (1) of the delivery of services,
and (2) of the acquisition and defense of adequate resources
assumed
(Bensen 1975). However, since resource adequacy Is
delivery of
to determine the level of performance In the
Is suggested that
services (Yuchtman and Seashore 1967), it
enterprise are those Inthe critical decisions In such an
the data to be
volving resource adequacy. Consequently,
In response to quesconsidered here will be that generated
since sufficient funding Is
tions of resource adequacy. And
resource most essential for
generally considered to be the
will be the focus of these
a public service enterprise, what
of organization Involved
considerations will be that nexus
financial resource adequacy
in determining, specifically,
In the Commonwealth. It seems
for public higher education
Involvement In the funding proreasonable to suggest that
That
mandated budgetary process.
cess is established by the
Figure 1, below.
process Is summarized In
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Time
Frame

Segmental
Boards

JUL

Budget
projections

AUG

Prepare
budgets

SEP

Submit
budgets to
BHE

OCT

NOV

Executive
Office

Board of
Higher Ed,

State
Legislature

Issue budget
instructions

—

Receive
segmental
budgets

Review
segmental
budgets

Conduct
regional
hearings

Submit
segmental
budgets with
recommendations
to Executive (l'
and Legislature

Receive
segmental
budgets from
BHE

J

.

Roo,eiveg

segmental
budgets from
EHE

(22)

DEC
Receives
Executive
budget request

Submit
«nnual budget
request (H-l

JaN

(H-l)

Conducts
oommittee
hearings
(each house)

jvPR

|

1

Submit separate
bills
Meet in joint
conference

Passes budget
appropriation

JUN
Governor signs
or line-item
vetoes budget
appropriation

Fig, 2 .

Operating Budget Flow Chart
Massachusetts Higher Education

*
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This process might then be condensed to the following
form (Glenny .1975)
(2)

(1)

Segmental budget
preparation and
submission

k

k.

(4)

(3)

BHE review
and
analysis

Legislative
review and
appropriation

Governor’s
signature or
line-item veto

k

k

Thus the public elements formally involved in the determina-

tion of fiscal adequacy for public higher education in

Massachusetts inolude (l) the segment-level Boards of
Trustees* (2) the Board of Higher Education (BHE) as the

statewide review agency* (3) the State Legislature* and (4)
the Executive.

Because these elements exercise differential

power within the budgetary prooess, they together can be
considered to constitute an interorganizational network.

will be
Consequently, analytic focus in the present study
at the network level.

That is, what will be considered

contingencies propohere is the adequacy of the specified
network
sltlons in comprehending the Interorganizational
Massachusetts public
responsible for fiscal adequacy In

higher education.
subject of
This is not to suggest, however, that the
decisions determining
analysis here will be those network
public higher education;
fiscal adequacy In Massachusetts
a test of minimal adequacy,
what is being suggested Is that, as
propositions should be able to
the specified contlngnecles
that network In general.
clearly comprehend decisions by
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We turn now to an evaluation of those propositions.

Theory

The first proposition
Consideration of the first specified contingencies

proposition—that power

is the consequence of the control

of strategic contingencies— requires specification of the

contingencies controlled by each element of the network

mandated by the budgetary process.

In this regard, the

legislature might reasonably be understood to control the
actual appropriation function upon which the budgetary
process is significantly contingent; the executive, to control the enactment or allocation function; the segmental

boards of trustees, to control the budget preparation function; and the BEE, to control only a process of review and

non -binding recommendation*
In the contingencies understanding, each of these

elements would be expected to experience and exercise power

within the network in direct proportion to the criticality
of the contingency over which it exercises control.

Thus,

review function
for example, because it controls only a
public
which is demonstrably non-critical in budgeting
expected to experience
higher education, the BHE would not be
the decision-making
or exercise significant power within
will be presented
network. Data testing these expectations
of the other spec!following the introduction and expansion
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fled contingencies propositions*

The second proposition
Consideration of the second specified proposition—
that consensus Is essential for the survival of domain

—

requires, first of all, specification of the domain of the

enterprise being analyzed.

For public higher education,

the domain is, quite simply, public higher education.

That

Is, the service offered is higher education; and the target

market or population is the general public.

The fact that

this domain is, in a sense, mandated rather than claimed,
does not in any way diminish the validity of the concept
in defining the statement of the network goal; nor would

the
the fact of a mandated domain be expected to eliminate

dependency of the network upon its task environment for
domain consensus.

In other words, unless the adequate

process Is suffifunding assured by the mandated budgetary
essential resources,
cient to assure the adequacy of other
to be dependent upon
the network would still be expected

these resources.
specific elements of its environment for
sufficient
adequate funding alone is not
In fact,

all other resources.
to assure an adequate supply of
made it unarguable that
Events of the past fe« years have
and professional staff suppublic support, client support
public
for the success of the
essential
absolutely
are
port
cannot be assured
enterprise, and yet these

higher education
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merely by adequate funding*

Consequently, public higher

eduoation would be expected to be required to engage In exchange for adequacy in these non-fiscal resources.

Exchange

would be expected to be with the specific locus of control
for each of these resources*

Control of both client support and public support

might perhaps be most accurately described as non -localized,

which is to suggest only that the avallablity of these resources is a function of conditions existing in the general
public*

Control of professional support, however, is in-

creasingly localized or concentrated in professional bar-

gaining groups, including specifically, the Massachusetts
Society of Professors (MSP), the American Association of

University Professors (AAUP), and the Massachusetts Teachers

Association (MTA) •

To achieve the consensus necessary to

achieve full resource adequacy, therefore, it is expected
to engage in
that public higher education will be required
both the general
exchange across its formal boundaries with

public and the professional bargaining groups.
of
still recognizing the different function
If,

the legislature and
each within the deolslon-maklng process,
considered together to
the executive might nevertheless be
below, represents
constitute the state "polity", Figure 3,
which would be expected to
the range of exchange relations
full resource adequacy
be essential for domain consensus-or

for public higher education*
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THE

Fig* 3

Exchanges in. the Consensus Assuring Public Higher Education
Resource Adequacy

To the extent that these elements beyond the formal network

boundaries significantly affeot the allocation and/or distribution of resources within the network » the general public
constitute,
and the professional bargaining associations
elements of what
by contingencies definition, significant
is therefore the network task environment.

The extent to which Figure

sentation— that

3

is

^

accurate repre-

eduis, the extent to which public higher

task environment for
cation is, in fact, dependent upon its
will be evaluated in
the consensus necessary for survival—
will also be determined
terms of the following data. What
of the other two specified
in this process is the adequacy
Involving the network and
contingencies propositions, both

change.
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Data

The data selected for consideration here describes a
reoent series of related decisions by the network described
above*

These particular decisions were selected as data

specifically for the purpose of evaluating the contingencies
propositions in question.

The decisions do not themselves

directly involve determinations of resource adequacy, but

were selected because they involve the network whose elements
would be expected to exercise and experience power in the
decision-making process as a consequence of their mandated
functions in the determination of resource adequacy.
natnand and public higher education

The national and local economic conditions during
the years 1974-1976 is common knowledge.

For public higher

has
education, the crucial consequence of this condition
remained relabeen that, as unemployment has increased and

education
tively high, the advantage of a post -secondary

securing employment has diminished.

in

As a result of the

of the attendant
realization of this fact—and of the effect
education—demand for public
inflation on the cost of higher
this year (1976-??) to the
higher education has diminished,
in Massachusetts is down
point where enrollment system-wide

approximately 8 percent.
responsible for deterThe response of the network
Massachusetts public higher
mining fiscal adequacy for

)
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education has been radical* After determining a budget for
the state system for PY 1975 which represented an Increase
of some 12.6 percent over the previous year» and despite a

significantly higher rate of inflation over that period,
the network determined a total budget increase for public

higher education of only 7.2 percent for the next two years
combined .

But of no less significance is the fact that,

at this time* the network also began serious consideration
of reorganizing public higher education in the Commonwealth.

Reorganization
Legislation to reorganize Massachusetts public
higher education was scheduled to be Introduced by the
President of the State Senate on

1

April 1976.

On March

reorganization bill was
31 the executive’s version of a

released from the governor's office.

The legislation submitted by the executive (H-4623
was entitled

*

An Act to Improve Statewide Oversight, Co-

Education and
ordination and Planning for Public Higher
to Provide for the
for Private Postseoondary Affairs and
Reorganization of the
Development of Alternative Plans for
The stated
Govemanoe System of Public Higher Education."
was contained In the
intent of the governor’s proposal

statement prefacing the bill:
eliminate duplication
The goal of that reform Is to among thevarlous
and fssume better coordination
lacks reliable
^rts of the system. The system now
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means to give proper direction and cohesion to
the state v s higher education investments and programs. Taxpayers, students and the higher education institutions are the losers. Without a
capacity to relate budgetary and program requirements to the needs of the Commonwealth and its
fiscal realities, public higher education will
begin to suffer an erosion of public support and
fail to fulfill its high promise of excellence.

A perhaps more direct statement of the intent of H-4623

is

contained in a statement from a "Draft for Discussion Purposes Only" (Parks 19?6) circulated previous to the actual

release of the bill, and suggesting that what was sought
by the executive was to ".

•

•

strengthen the authority and

capability to exercise central oversight over budgets, plan-

ning and programs that affect the total higher education
system."

The Senate Presidents reorganization bill (S-1371),
and another version originating with the BHE (H-4482 )

,

were

subsequently submitted to the legislature with substantially
the same stated intent as the governor's bill, i.e., reform
publio higher
of the system of governance of Massachusetts

education.

In contingencies terms, the Intent of all three

planning
bills might be described as the creation of a
from the
capability to buffer the decision-making network
And just as
effects of subsequent environmental variation.
common stated intent,
all three reform paokages shared the a

substantially the
the proposed means to that end is also
a strong, centralized,
same in all three bills! creation of

statewide coordinating agency.
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Consistent with Its own agenda, the BHE sought to
itself become the proposed coordinating agency by attempting
in its bill merely to expand its own functions and responsi-

bilities within the public higher education decision-making
network.

Thus the BHE bill, H-4482, specifically empowers

the BHE to, in addition to its existing functions, (l) make

additions, deletions and modifications to the annual budget

and capital outlay requests prepared by the public segments,

and (2) prepare a post-audit report of the public institutions and segments for the legislature and the executive

within three months of the close of the fiscal year

(McLaughlin

1976 ).

Both the legislature and the executive, however,

were obviously guided by quite different concerns*

Speci-

fically, both seem to have been responding more to the realicondization that, regardless of economic and/or employment

public higher
tions, the end of the period of expansion for
fact of
education had already been determined by the hard
Increasingly attend
declining birthrates; and that what would

higher education
Involvement In decision-malting for public
expansion of political
would be, not opportunities for the
for the inevitable uninfluence, but rather responsibility
facilities consolidation
popular decisions on program and
legislature and the executive,
and elimination. For both the
coordinating agency might
then, the proposed centralized
represented a politically
reasonably be suggested to have
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acceptable means, not only for Improving the governance of

public higher education in Massachusetts, but also for
diverting the focus of responsibility for the Impending,
politically difficult decisions.
In contrast to the BHE, therefore, both the legis-

lature and the executive seek control only of the nature
and membership of the board which would have directed the

proposed coordinating agency*

Thus, the Senate President’s

bill (S-1371) sought the creation of a "College and University System of Massachusetts Board of Trustees", a "super-

board", replacing the five segmental boards of trustees,

but consisting Initially of members elected from those

boards*

This last stipulation is generally agreed to have

by
been intended to assure the control of the proposed board
considerable
persons with whom the legislature still exercised
legislativeinfluence as a result of the basically positive
recent past
segmental relations which had characterized the

period of expansion in public higher education.
provided
Similarly, the executive -authored H-4623
Colleges and
for a "Board of Overseers for Massachusetts
function of this
Universities", also a superboard. The
been governance, but rather
board, however, was not to have
reorganization proposalsthe review of three alternative
model —or. If necessary,
includlng the Senate President's
designed by the proposed board
the recommendation of a plan
H-4623 proposed a memberItself. And almost predictably,
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ship formula which would assure that the proposed board

would be controlled by persons with whom the executive
exercised considerable influence.

Specifically, the bill

provided that 14 of the board's 23 members, including

6

from existing segmental boards of trustees, would be appointed directly by the governor, and a 15 th member would
be the governor's own Secretary for Educational Affairs.

There is no evidence to suggest that the BHEsponsored bill to reorganize Massachusetts public higher

education (h- 4482) ever received serious legislative consideration.

However, neither the executive's bill (H-4623 )i

nor the Senate President's version (S-1371) seem to have
fared any better.

While H-4623 was reported out of the

neither
House Education Committee and sent to the Senate side,

that bill nor S-1371 was ever reported to the Senate.
submitted to
Only two reorganization proposals were
again by the
the subsequent legislative session, one (H-5756)
of the BHE. This
executive, and another (H-619) on behalf
committee. What has
time neither bill was reported out of

Senate Instead Is a
been submitted from the House to the
ribbon study commission"
proposal (S-16811) creating a "blue
reorganize public higher educeabout what should be done to

tion in the Commonwealth.

data which now will be conThis, then, has been the
sidered in contingencies terms.
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Application: Theory to Data

That power is the consecu enoe of the control of atrat^ir.
contingencies.

.

,

According to Clegg

(

1975 )» the contingencies under-

standing of power is derived from Max Weber's concept of
"might".

For Weber, power or "might" was the probability

that one actor in a social relationship would be in a posi-

tion to carry out his will.

In decision-making terms, then,

power might be considered to be the probability that one
party to an exchange will be in a position to influence the

decision of the other party or parties.

Thus, if power in

contingencies terms is the consequence of control of stra-

tegic contingencies, then wherever there Is evidence of the
exercise of power or influence, there should also be able to
be specified oontlngenoies being controlled.

In fact, for

each of the decisions described in the preceeding data,

there is substantial evidence of both the exercise of power
or influence, and the control of contingencies from which
that power or influence is specified to be derived.

First of all, in the almost complete lack of serious

legislative consideration accorded the BHE-sponsored re-

organization proposal it Is obvious that the BHE was in no
position to significantly influence decisions on that bill.

This is consistent with the contingencies expectation stated
of Its
earlier suggesting that, as a consequence of the fact

60

lack of control over any contingencies critical to the
public higher education enterprise, the BHE would not be in
a position to influence decisions affecting that enterprise.
In the legislative determination of both the execu-

tive's bill and the Senate President's plan, however, there
is unmistakable evidence of the exercise of considerable

power i

Despite the existence of a general consensus within

the public higher education decision-making network on the

need for reorganization, both measures failed.

The contin-

gencies explanation seems reasonable.
In the case of the executive's proposal, while the

executive does control certain contingencies in the legis-

lative process, the contingencies controlled by the Senate
President (e»g.» committee assignments) are demonstrably

more critical to the members of the deliberative body involved.

This fact, in conjunction with the fact of the

antagonism which existed at that time between the executive
the
and the Senate President, accounts for the actions of
expire.
Education Committee allowing the executive's bill to

not to report
That is, the decision of the senate committee
as organizathe governor's bill is entirely comprehensible
an agent controlltional action reflecting the influence of

organization#
ing contingencies critical to that
comprecontingencies understanding similarly

The

President's own reorganlzahends the failure of the Senate
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tlon

proposal to gain Senate approval.

In this case,

while the Senate President does control contingencies critical to the development of a legislative (i,e., political)

career, It Is Increasingly the large* well -organized bar-

gaining groups whloh control the contingency most critical
to the mere existence of a political career

—the

elections.

And while the Senate President's reorganization plan did
assure

—at

least Initially

— segmental

control of the proposed

"super board"* the centralization Implicit in the plan was

perceived by the professional bargaining associations In-

volved with Massachusetts public higher education as a
direct threat to Institutional autonomy, and consequently
by,
to the labor accords achieved within, and guaranteed

that autonomy.

The response of these associations to the

Senate President's plan (S-1371) was unequivocal.
Committee
In testimony before the Joint Legislative
Massachusetts Society of
on Education, the President of the

Professors (1976) stated.
consolldatS-1371 Is a radical document drastically
In
education
higher
lng and centralizing public
reg
thou
wl
Massachusetts. It Is utterly
t
totally destruc
existing Institutions or practices,
massive
a
effect
•Mve of campus autonomy --and in
from educators
transfer of power and responsibility
of
mentality
onthe scene to the oountlnghouse
businessmen at the top.
by the Executive ComSimilarly, the -Proposed Statement
Conference of the AAUP on the
mittee of the Massachusetts
Education (1976) protests
Reorganization of Public Higher
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The tendency of superboards to violate the
principle of institutional autonomy, and their
Intrusion In those concerns of Individual colleges and universities that are the traditional
and actual responsibility of faculty, administrators, and the student body—working In
cooperation with local boards concerns which
keep each institution responsive to the unique
needs of Its constituency*

—

And finally, a statement by the Division of Government Services of the Massachusetts Teachers Association concludes!
Just a cursory reading of S-1371 reveals that
the current re-drafted version is seriously deficient in the protection of professional and
labor rights of faculty. In short, the new
1371 is totally a management document (1976).

At the time of these statements, the MTA alone
claimed to represent faculty at 21 of the state’s 30 public

higher education institutions, and some 63,000 teachers
statewide.

Again, the action of the senate committee in

not reporting the Senate President’s proposal is entirely
comprehensible as a reflection of the influence or power

which is the consequence of the control of the election
contingency which these numbers represent.
At this point, It seems reasonable to suggest (1)
decisionthat there exists In the public higher education
shown to be the
making network no power which cannot be
critical to elements
consequence of control of contingencies

contingencies proposition
of that network; and (2) that the
and control seems
suggesting the relation between power
comprehension of the data
therefore to be adequate In Its

presented.
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That consensus form the task environment is essential for
the survival of domain

.

.

*

Given the obvious exercise of influence by the professional bargaining associations on the reorganization
question* there seems little grounds for challenging the

contingencies contention that consensus from the task en-

vironment is essential for a functional domain.

In contin-

gencies terms, the function of the organizational network
is decision -making, and in this case, without the positive

support of the relevant seotor of the task environment, the

network has very simply been unable to effect any decision.

And if further Indication of the necessity for consensus from the task environment is needed, one need only

consider the effects of the decreased popular support and
has
diminished client demand which public higher education

experienced over the past several years.

It Is this retreat

which constitutes.
from exchange with public higher education
of consensus, and which
In contingencies terms, a withdrawal
the difficult reorganizahas necessitated consideration of
contingencies proposition question. Again, the relevant
education does seem to
tion appears adequate t public higher
task environment for the
be unarguably dependent upon Its
for, not only essenconsensus necessary merely to function}
sense of the term, out
tial resources In the conventional
decisions as well.
for validation of organizational
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That the network form resists change until necessitated
by environmental variation

.

.

.

The entire series of network decisions regarding
the possibility of change implicit in reorganization

— from

the various determinations on proposed legislation to the

decision to create a third party commission

— seems

ample

evidence of the adequacy of the specific contingencies

proposition being considered in this section.

The network

has, in fact, effectively resisted change even as It has

publicly acknowledged the necessity of, and committed itself
to, that change.

What the data also suggest, however, is a

perhaps clearer understanding of the sense in which the

network form "resists” change.
In the matter of reorganization, there is no evi-

or
dence to suggest that the network actively resisted
evidence to suggest
avoided the Implicit ohange. There Is no

seeking to effect
that the network Is not. In faot, honestly
therefore. Is that
ohange. What Is suggested by the data,
Is the very complexity of
what resists change In the network
the network and Its
relations both Intranetwork and between
That Is, since detask environment— in the network form.
plural, and since the validaclslon -making In the network is
oonsensual, to is extremely
tion of the network domain Is
which will not adversely
difficult even to consider a change
to
controls contingencies critical
which
element
some
affect
consequently block the change
the network, and which can

—
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under consideration.

It Is In this sense only, and not In

any active sense, that the network form "resists" change.
It should also be noted that, because in the matter

of reorganization change has not yet occurred, the degree

of environmental variation necessary to effect change cannot
be evaluated in the present study.
tv^e

polity will attempt to assure network integrity

•primarily by manipulation of the network environment

.

»

.

In the matter of reorganization, the polity (l.e.,

the executive and the legislature) has attempted to effect

what is felt to be necessary network change by means of
legislation, first of all, to create a "superboard" to imMassachuprove the governance of public higher education in
"blue ribblon
setts, and more recently, seeking to create a

alternatives.
study commission" to evaluate the reorganization
comprehensible in
In fact, both sets of actions are entirely
manipulation,
contingencies terms as forms of environmental

or "manipulated field control".
that the integrity
What must be clearly understood is
for public higher education
of the decision-making network
all, the changes In
was seriously threatened by, first of
recently begun to exenvironmental conditions which It had

Inability to effect a soluperience, and then, by Its own
those changing conditions.
tion in response to the fact of
understanding expects Is, again,
contingencies
the
what
And

•
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manipulation of the network environment by the polity to
assure the integrity of the network.
effort to create a

" superboard",

In fact* both the

and the effort to appoint

a "blue ribbon planning commission" are understandable as
attempts at manipulated field control.

The establishment of a "superboard" is understandable in contingencies terms as an attempt by the polity to

establish in the inter-institutional environment an agency
controlling contingencies sufficiently critical to achieve

institutional compliance*

That is* in the superboard the

polity can be understood to be attempting to create a means
of indirectly intervening in Institutional decision-making
educafor the purpose of achieving from the public higher
statewide
tion institutions decisions more reflective of

considerations
is
Similarly, the "blue ribbon study commission"

attempt by the
understandable in contingencies terms as an
of the public higher
polity to establish in the environment
the potential to
education decision-making network Itself

change as a response.
elicit from the network necessary
Indication of the power of at
This is perhaps the clearest
proposition: It Is able
least this particular contingencies
control organizational action
to comprehend In terms of
as a forfeiture of control.
which must otherwise be viewed
perspective must be said to be
And again, the contingencies

adequate.
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Evaluation
To paraphrase Whitehead (1962), a theory Is con-

sidered to be adequate only when every actual or empirical
Instance has the essential characteristics of some element
of the theory*

In this sense* the mid-range or contingencies

theory—or at least the fundamental propositions specifically
considered in the present study—does appear to be adequate
in its comprehension of data from Massachusetts public

higher education*

That is, every incident from the data

considered has been found to have its theoretical equivalent
in contingencies theory*

Admittedly, this is to suggest nothing more than
that the contingencies model seems to provide an adequate
"ex post facto" description or explanation of decision-

making in Massachusetts public higher education regarding
specifically the question of reorganization.

But the possi-

perble criticism that the data selected are atypical might
no
haps be countered by the assertion that the model appears
of whether
less adequate in comprehending the ongoing question

the executive or the legislature

will represent the state in

unions. Again,
collective bargaining with the various faculty
the contingencies conas with the reorganization question,
seem both relecepts of control and strategic contingencies

network actions.
vant and useful in the comprehension of
in the current
As Jacob Bronowski has noted, however,
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scientific society, the adequacy of a theory Is ultimately
determined, not by how well it explains actions and con-

sequences which have already occurred, but rather how well
it indicates the actual consequences of potential actions.

The final consideration of the present study, then, will be
of the potential actions available to public higher educa-

tion in general to achieve the consequences desired.

CHAPTER IV
THEORY TO PRACTICE

For publio higher education In the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, what Is desired Is control of the lnter-

lnstitutional network sufficient to assure the Integrity of
that network during conditions, especially, of low demand

and general resource scarcity.

What has been proposed toward

this end, as has been noted, and what contingencies theory

would seem to Indicate, Is the creation of an agency In the
inter-institutional environment with control of contingencies sufficiently critical to the target Institutions to

assure compliance and cooperation.

In Massachusetts, as in

public higher education aoross the nation, the proposed
form.
agency has most often taken the statewide coordinating

The coordinating agency
category
The term "coordinating agency" is a general
board" and
including "voluntary association", "coordinating
In a
"consolidated governing board" as specific forms.
Commission (1971>
relatively recent study by the Carnegie
the statewide coordinating
p. 26 ), the various forms of
perform the following
agency were found to be expected to

functions:

—Avoid wasteful duplication

in programs and
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harmful competition for resources

—Work toward greater efficiency

in the use of

scaroe resources

—Aid the orderly growth

of all postseoondary
facilities within the state* including consideration of locations for new oampuses

—Assist in developing state policy on admission
of students to higher education

—Collect data for policy determination
—Encourage sufficient diversity within the
system to satisfy the diverse educational
needs of the state

—Serve

as a communications agenoy among the
postseoondary education community, the state
government and the public

in the development of the
variety of programs involved in the expanding

—Poster excellence

postsecondary education network

Again according to the Carnegie Commission (1971* P*27)»
however, the success of the general coordinating category
in attaining these ends has been considerably less than

complete i
Some states have been relatively successful in
preventing duplication in the establishment of
new programs, but relatively little success has
been experienced in the elimination of existing
duplication. Coordinating agencies have not
exhibited much capacity for increasing diversity,
and have given little but lip service to fosterof the
ing excellence in the academic programs
have
agencies
many
hand,
state. On the other
postsecamong
performed well as communicators
the Public.
ondary education, the legislatures andconfined
to
been
has
However, this communication
expansion
for
primarily the needs for resources
programs for more
of the network. Although most
limited to
effective use of resources have been optimum
space utilization studies, achieving
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student -teacher ratios and year-round utilization » some have dealt with more fundamental
matters of structure and function in higher
education* Agencies have also experienced
some success in curbing unwise expansion , in
locating new campuses in urban areas, and in
developing technical programs for community
colleges*
Still, despite such findings of uneven performance

by the general coordinating category, there is a definite

long-term trend toward coordination:

In 1940, 33 states had

no mechanism for the coordination of public higher education;
ourrently, only 3 states are without some form of coordina-

tion (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching
1976)*

Yet while there is this obvious substantial consen-

sus on the need for coordinating at least public higher

education, there is a Just as apparent diversity of opinion
Ta-

over exactly which form this coordination should take.
ble

1

coshows the patterns of distribution of the various

ordinating forms over the past several decades.

States with:
No formal coordination
Voluntary coordination
Coordination Boards
Advisory
Regulatory

Consolidated
governing boards

1969

1939

1949

1959

1964

33

28

17

11

3

0

3

7

4

1

2

3

10

18

(1)

(1)

(5)

(11)

(1)

(2)

(5)

(7)

27
(13)
(14)

15

16

16

17

19
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The diversity of forms of coordination represented In Table
1

might reasonably be viewed as a function of the problem

of governance in public higher education.

Coordination, governance and autonomy

The problem of governance exists in the conflict between*
on the one hand* the Intent of the polity to assure the in-

tegrity of the public higher education enterprise by attempting to control

the unacceptable institutional impulses toward

competition for funding and duplication of programs, and on
the other, the insistence of existing governing boards on
the continued recognition of the institutional autonomy

which has traditionally been their prerogative.
The contingencies understanding would seem to indicate that to be effective, a coordinating agency must nec-

essarily control functions or contingencies of sufficient

criticality to assure institutional compliance with agency
decisions.

Further, the contingencies view would suggest

most critithat, since fiscal adequacy is assumed to be the
the most
cal contingency for public service institutions,

would be
effective way to assure institutional compliance
control of some sigto allocate to the coordinating agency

nificant function in the budgetary process.
to the extent
But as Folger (1975. P*23°) explains,

that It does Include

•

•

oontrol of the budget, then

powers, since the state
coordination borders on governance

,
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agency In these cases has effective veto power over the
academic development of institutions."

This, then, is the

concern of the public higher education community, not only
in Massachusetts, but nationwide: that coordinating agencies

will develop into "de facto" governance bodies,
•
•
too far removed from the sublet les and
•
complexities of local situations to treat each
institution with respect for its unique traditions, problems and clientele.
(Further),
what looks to an outsider like institutional
nationalism and empire building, looks to an
insider like necessary and natural growth, and
is the unavoidable price which must be paid for
dynamic institutions (Berdahl 1971, p*31).

And Berdahl (1971t P«3l) summarizes the feeling of the proponents of maximum institutional autonomy:
If one wants to cope with diversity, the only
hope is to have many centers of authority and
decision-making, not one. This may lead to
some confusion, competition and a certain amount
of wasteful duplication, but it will be less
wasteful and demoralizing than over-centralization.

M.M. Chambers (1976, p.30l), a long-time commentator on higher

education, enthusiastically concurs:

The best modem theory and practice in largescale business management now favors decentralization, involving the loosening of rigid controls
and the delegation of wide discretion to divisions and departments to avoid the well-known
apoplexy at the apex and paralysis at the periphery.
tend
Finally, the recommendations of the Carnegie Commission

substantially to support the proponents of institutional
autonomy.

In a report titled

The Capitol and the Campus

coordinating agencies
the Commission strongly urges that state
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--whatever their specific form~should confine themselves
to planning and advising; that they should not manage, ad-

minister or to any substantial degree govern local institutions from the state level:
While recognizing the need for more effective
coordination for postsecondary education at the
state level, the Commission recommends that the
state strongly resist:
!•

Investing coordinating agencies with administrative authority, particularly over budget
matters, or

2. Establishing single governing boards, except
in those states in whioh a special combination

of historical factors and present circumstances make such agencies more feasible than
other types of coordinating agencies.

A brief review of trends

in the form of coordination

established during the recent decades might at first seem to
suggest that the proponents of institutional autonomy are

prevailing in their demands that such agencies be limited,
and
as suggested by the Carnegie Commission, to planning

advising.

Pflnster (1976, p.l<>5)f for example, notes that

been established
while 18 boards with merely advisory power have
with governing
since I960, only 5 boards have been established

powers.

reveals
Closer examination of the data, however,

considerably greater complexity.

A careful examination of Table

1

above, for instance,

of coordinating boards
reveals that while a clear majority
by 1969 . the regulatory form
in 1964 were merely advisory,
confirms this
was in the majority. Folger (1975, P-231)
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finding:
The history of the last decade indicates that the
"advisory only" form of coordination has usually
been subsequently strengthened. State legislatures and governors expect the state agency to
come to grips with the major problems in higher
education, and if "advice" does not get the Job
done, then the tendency has been to give the
agency increased directing and controlling power.

What emerges from the data is actually a pattern in

whioh the proponents of local autonomy seem able initially
to prevent the allocation of substantial power to the

coordinating agency, which is then invested with necessary

power by the polity as it becomes apparent that substantive
control is necessary to effect real solutions to the problems
in higher education.

And it seems reasonable to suggest

that it is because the establishment of statewide coordination is, in this sense, a developmental process that there
currently exist in the United States alone some 18 sub-

stantially different forms of coordinating higher education
(Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 1976).

Generally, the kind of diversity which currently

exists in the coordination of state higher education in

America would be viewed as valuable for assuring exploraforms.
tion and consideration of a wide range of alternative

Unfortunatley, however, a recent study by the Carnegie

Foundation (19?6, P*8?) concludes:
states,

With all this experimentation by the 5°
approach is
it cannot yet be shown that any one
impacts .
superior to any other approach in its
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There is seemingly no known "quantifiable"
consequence for actual operating results that
can be associated with one or another approach
to centralization of authority . . . not on
any thus fax statistically tested result.
It is not enough, then, for the contingencies model

to indicate that the appropriate action for the end intended
in public higher education would seem to be the establish-

ment of an agency in the interlnstitutlonal environment

with power or control of contingencies sufficient to assure
compliance by the institutions.

Lacking adequate empirical

data, what is also needed, is an indication of what form of

control or coordination might be most effective and practicable, given the parameters of the problem of governance.

Coordination in the contingencies understanding
Again, power in the contingencies understanding is

specified as the consequence of the control of contingencies
critical to an enterprise.

Because advice has apparently

not been considered critical in public higher education, it

would therefore be expected that the merely advisory coordiassure
nating form would not experience power sufficient to
developmental
or permit implementation of its decisions. The
form, and
trend described above— away from the advisory
would seem to
toward the allocation of regulatory powers—

experience of the EHE
affirm this expectation, as would the
in Massachusetts.

coordinating form, howThe consolidated governing

•

•

»

77

ever* at least In the contingencies view, would seem to be

similarly unacceptable*

Because the process of governance

necessarily direot involvement in institutional decisionmaking* the consolidated governing form would not be expec-

ted to be effective*

This is primarily because the act of

centralization would produce a level of complexity in the
unit to be governed which would be expected, in contingencies
terms, to deflect and distort actions from the state level.

The validity or accuracy of this expectation would seem to
be affirmed by the fact that states reporting an "effective"

consolidated governing coordination form invariably have
a relatively few institutions to coordinate (Berdahl 1971
p*258)

What remains is the regulatory form of coordination,

and while there is no clear contingencies recommendation for
this form, Berdahl (1971* P.258) reports:
Most experts seem to favor the coordinating board
(with regulatory powers) over the consolidated
governing board, partly because in states where
institutions are already governed by local or
segmental boards, the regulatory coordinating
board allows more autonomy and is therefore
politically easier to insert into the existing
structure than is a consolidated governing boards.
board which attempts to supercede existing
coordinating
Thus the simple advantage of the regulatory
governance Is merely that
form as opposed tO consolidated
politically more
the coordinating board Is felt to be
(

pract i cabl e

There is with the regulatory coordinating form,
however, still the problem of governance.

While contin-

gencies understanding on the one hand indicates that power
sufficient to achieve compliance can be assured only through

substantive involvement in the budgetary process, and on the

other suggests that direct involvement in institutional de-

cision-making is not expected to be effective for the reasons

described earlier, experience insists that some degree of
governance from the state level is necessary for effective

problem solving.

What becomes necessary, therefore, to assure

a coordinating agency of only the power necessary and sufficient for its function is the possibility of power which is

not the consequence of direct involvement in institutional

decision-making ; the possibility of control over critical
contingencies which is not governance.

John G. liuggie de-

scribes the conditions for Just such a possibility.

Governance as rul e-def inla&
a problem
According to Buggle (1975). governance is
it is assumed to be a
in the present context only because
is, governance is generally seen

derivative activity.

That

by, the failures or
as resulting from, and being Justified
In fact, suginadequacies of less controlled conditions.

are not the consequence
gests Ruggie, free market conditions

governance forces, but rather
of a lack of Involvement by
of successive governments.
have been assured by the actions
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He concedes that certain governance activities may
In fact
be the resultant of an unacceptable Interaction
between competing Interests, but he also warns that to limit the under-

standing of governance to merely these activities is simply

unrealistic.

As an alternative, Ruggle (1975, p.14?) sug-

gests that governance be understood in terms of a process

by which the rules which structure publicly relevant behavior
come to be defined:

This conception enables us to distinguish between
the "purpose" of governance, the ^instrumental
forms" of governance, and the "institutional elements" of governance • • • These distinctions are
important because they elucidate exactly what the
gov emance-is -derivative view includes and what
it excludes. That view accounts in the main only
for programs and policies (institutional elements)
which it sees as resulting from intergroup competition. It assumes that the natural setting of
such competition (the instrumental form) is a
market -like structure. Finally, it excludes the
realm of rule definition with which policies appropriate to high levels of complexity must begin.

What this suggests in the current context is that
the institutional elements of governance (l.e., programs and

policies) be left, appropriately enough, at the institutional
level, while the regulatory coordinating agent might then be

expected to experience power as a consequence of controlling
the rule-defining function of governance.

In terms of the

participation in the budgetary process which is felt to be

essential for power in a services economy, it might reasongovernably be suggested that the rule-defining function of
the necessary
ance would involve primarily the construction of
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budgetary formulas.

Formula-defining as governance
Berdahl (1971> p.122), citing James L. Miller, describes budget formulas as

•

•

attempts to estimate future

fiscal needs on the basis of certain assumptions about enrollments* faculty/ student ratios, average teacher salaries,

ratio of instructional expenses to other institutional outlays, etc.*

(For two examples of the use of budget formulae

see Appendix A.)

According to Berdahl (1971* P*123), the

major benefits of the use of formulae for budgeting were
found to include fiscal flexibility, more adequate state
support and more equitable treatment of institutions*
It may seem strange to attribute fiscal flexibility
to a system that calls for maximum objectivity of
data, but the explanation lies in the fact that
formulae and cost analyses are presently used to
formulate "asking budgets", not "spending budgets".
Thus, an institution may be allotted so many dollars on the basis of formulae and other Justifications and then be left fairly free to spend the
funds where they are most needed.

definition
Significantly, then, the control exercised in the
indirect* once alloof systemwide formulae is demonstrably
can be districated, the funds Justified by the formulae

segments with only
buted within the various institutions or
distribution of
those constraints normally attending the
potential of the formula
public funds. At -the same time the
is reflected in the concern
as an effective means of control
reported by Berdahl (1971,
of Institutional representatives

"
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p.128), that formulae and coat analyses might actually
"•

•

•

be used as either active or latent meohanlsms of

control •
Thus* control of the rule-defining governance func-

tion of budget formula definition would. In fact, seem to
assure the coordinating agency with the power necessary to

achieve segmental and/or institutional compliance, without

directly intervening in local decisions.

However, while

critical decisions in public higher education are generally

assumed to Involve determinations of the budget, there is
another set of decisions which may, in many cases, actually

determine the range of solutions available to the budgetary
process.

That set of decisions is the organizational planning

process.

The possibility of plannin g revisited
".
In Chapter One, planning was characterized as

.

.

programmatic activity by those in authority, specifically,
than what the
the making of choices about who gets what other
is decisionmarket would produce." Planning, in this sense,

considered a
making, and as such, it might reasonably be
this sense, planning
form of "governance -is -derivative". In

Increasingly ineffective
has been suggested to be becoming
governance in the limited
for exactly the same reasons as
the probability of
sense: i.e., as complexity increases,
outcomes of the actions
correctly anticipating the actual

(
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chosen In planning becomes greatly diminished.

Ruggle

(1975)* however, argues that what Is limited la not the

possibility of planning, but rather the terms in which
planning Is understood, and consequently, the criteria

used to determine the success of planning.
As an alternative, Ruggle (1975* p*147) suggests
an understanding of planning In which "•

•

•

the planning

process is Identified with the broader realm of policy for-

mation rather than with particular decision points."

Ac-

cording to Ruggle, the purpose of plans, as well as the
success criteria by means of which their effectiveness Is
evaluated, vary systematically depending upon the character
of preferences regarding policy outcomes, and upon beliefs

(understanding) about the cause-effect relations associated

with the plans.

In a technique drawn directly from Thomp-

son (1967), he represents the four logical combinations pf

certainty or uncertainty about preferences and causation:

Preferences
Regarding
Outcomes
Uncertain

Enabling by
adjustment;
Educational test

Source 1 Ruggle (1975* p*l^)*

3

)

Enabling by
inspiration;
Participatory (4)

33

Ruggie

(

1975* P* 149) explains:

Much of planning is now assumed to consist of
implementing decisions when knowledge about desired outcomes is certain (cell 1 and cell 2).
Consequently, two kinds of implementation are
now recognized* by computing the "best" solution
where cause-effect knowledge is certain, and by
relying upon judgement where it is not. If
cause-effect knowledge is certain, the evaluation criterion is efficiency, that is, the least
costly means of reaching the goal. Where it is
not certain, instrumental tests are used and the
plan is evaluated on whether it reached the intended goal at all.
Since it is generally conceeded that current levels of social and organizational complexity all but preclude certainty

about causation (cell l), planning has Increasingly become a

process of implementation by judgement (cell 2), involving

instrumental criteria of success.

But as was noted earlier

in this paper, what instrumental criteria consistently have

begun to indicate is a critical lack of success by the
judgemental mode in anticipating the actual outcomes of
actions.

And it is to the extent to which both the judge-

mental and the computational modes have been assumed to represent the full range of the planning activity, that planning

has been felt to have become "impossible".

Ruggie (1975* P*l49) points out, however, that this
is too limited an understanding of plannings

An alternative conception would view planning as
not simply the Implementation of predetermined
and
policies, but as coordination of expectations
should
social knowledge as well. Specifically,
of
cause -effect knowledge exist in the absence
planning
preferences about outcomes (cell 3)»

,
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ought to facilitate mutual adjustment among
competing preferences as well . . . The success of planning in this case should then
be
measured by how much is learned about problems
in which preferences are uncertain* However
should uncertainty characterize both causeeffect knowledge and preferences about outcomes (oell 4), the activity ought to inspire
public participation* The success of planning
then would be measured by the quality of the
participation and of the sooial knowledge developed as a result of participation. It
would be absurd to evaluate the "success" of
planning on the basis of instrumental efficiency in either of these two cases*

For Ruggie, as much as implementation, planning is
a process of enabling*

This expanded understanding of plan-

ning is compelling for a number of reasons.

First of all,

planning-as-enabling is, by definition, only indirect in-

volvement in institutional decision-making, and is therefore
compatible with contingencies prescriptions.

Thus, for

public higher education, planning would refer to the full
range of activities and strategies by means of which the

rules and formulae governing that enterprise would come to
be defined*

Secondly, then, this understanding of planning is

compatible

with— even enriohes— the

as-rule-def lnition*

concept of govemance-

Rule defining, in this sense, becomes

the very process of planning*

Consequently, critical plans,

defintions and formulae, rather than being imposed upon the

various institutions, would be expected instead to emerge
instifrom a consensus in whioh the participation of those
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tutions would be essential for success.
Thus, an understanding of planning as social

learning and consensus -building is compelling in that it

recognizes the necessity of institutional participation for
success in planning, while emphasizing the fact that insti-

tutional autonomy can only be assured by the constant

participation of the institutions in the planning process.
Canadian educator Claude Bissell (1968, p.v):

Autonomy does not depend upon financial independence, for in these times, no university . . •
is financially independent. Nor does it depend
upon isolation from politics, which at best is
nervous and unreal, for every university these
days must engage in constant conversations with
those who have been elected to public office.
Autonomy really depends on a broad social
assumption that, despite the exigencies of the
moment, we must not make decisions on Inadequate
information.
Given the reality of competing institutional interests, and
diverse preferences about outcomes, it becomes the responsi-

bility of each institution to honestly and adequately repreprocess
sent its own perspective, to participate in an ongoing

which
of social learning, and to actively seek a consensus
least
will assure the equitablllty, if not of outcomes, at

of the planning process.

Finally, then, this understanding of planning-aseven requires—
enabling is compelling because it permits—

rejection of the "Impossibility" theorem.

To the extent

participation and conthat social learning, Institutional
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sensus building are possible , then planning is possible.

And as Increasing social complexity obscures and defies
solution in either the computational or Judgemental sense,
planning as a process of information exchange becomes in-

creasingly oritloal.

SoflolHffEon

Contending that the mid-range or contingencies

understanding of network does, in fact, seem adequately to
comprehend the organizational actions of public higher education in Massachusetts, what has been intended in this
final chapter is a consideration of what action would then

be prescribed to assure the effective political management
of that enterprise*

What was found to be indicated by the

contingencies model is the establishment in the institu-

tional network of an agency controlling contingencies suf-

ficiently oritloal to assure Institutional compliance.

Given this preference, what was found to be practicable is
the creation of a statewide regulatory coordinating board,

exercising only that power which it experiences as a conof
sequence of its control of the rule-defining function

for
governance, specifically, of budget formula definition

public higher education.

Finally, it was suggested that

process of enabling,
planning is possible— even critical— as a
institutional partii.e*, as a process of social learning,

cipation and consensus
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This last point Is Important , for the assertion
that planning Is no longer possible has serious implications.
To paraphrase Jacob Bronowski (1974), humankind Is nature's

unique experiment to make the rational Intelligence prove
itself sounder than reflex.

Acceptance of the impossibility

of planning would mark the end of that experiment.

Like

Ruggle, however, Bronowski insists that rational activity is

rarely a function exclusively of the kind of computation

which has come to be identified as planning:
It is not true that we run our lives by any computer scheme of problem solving. The problems of
life sure insoluble in that sense. Instead, we
shape our activities by finding strategies to insure that- what is attractive in the short term Is
weighed in the balance of the ultimate, long-term
satisfactions (1974, p.437 )•

Realization in the present study of the clear possibility
of planning as strategies of enabling, then, merely em-

phasizes the necessity of aligning the organizational understanding of planning with the true nature of human rationality.
must
Like the human rational process, organizational planning

the full
be recognized to be, not merely decision-making, but

organizational
range of possible strategies by means of which

action comes to reflect organizational ends.

J
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APPENDIX. A

TWO EXAMPLES OF FORMULA BUDGET IN t,

APPLIED TO HIGHER EDUCATION
Connecticut

a) Faoulty

Level of
Instruction

Faculty/
Student
ratio

Lower
Division
19.35
Upper
Division
11.60
Master’
Degree
7.5
The si
Supervision
Independent
Study

Credit Hrs.
Per FTE
Student

Student
Credit
Hours/l
Faculty
Position

15.5

300

15.5

180

12.0

90

———

25

Faculty
Positions

1 aSS’t
Professor
1 Ass t/
Associate
1 ASSOC
Pro fessor
'

1

Full

Professor
b) Nonfaoulty

clerical positions for one dean
clerical position for one department chairman
1 clerical position for four faculty
1 lab assistant for 60 stations
2

1

2.

Oklahoma:

After deriving a faoulty salary budget along the lines of those given
above for Connecticut, the Oklahoma institutional budget formulas are
then determined as follows:
a) Budget Base: Faoulty Salaries plus 30$ of

faoulty salaries constitute

the Budget Base
b) Organized activities Related to Instruction: 3$ of Budget Base
o) General administration: 7$ of Budget Base
d)

General Expenses: 8$ of Budget Base

e) Organized Research: 12$ of Budget Base
f)

Extension and Public Service: University of Oklahoma: 14$; Oklahoma
State University: 11$ of Budget Base

g) Library: 8$ of Budget Base

h) Physical Plant: 16$ of Budget Base
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